



SAS027 Analysis of Smaller Scale Contingencies



Measures of Merit for Defense Resource Planning of Small-Scale Contingencies

7-9 October 2002

CDR Aasgeir Gangsaas

Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Program Analysis and Evaluation)

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 09 OCT 2002		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE SAS027 Analysis of Smaller Scale Contingencies: Measures of Meritfor Defense Resource Planning of Small-Scale Contingencies				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Office of the Secretary of Defense(Program Analysis and Evaluation)				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES See also ADM001758, NATO RTO-TR-SAS-027 Handbook on the Analysis of Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations in Long Term Defence Planning (Manuel de lanalyse des opérations de circonstance de moindre échelle pour la planification de la défense à long terme)., The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 45	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Agenda

- Background and Scope of Study
- Small Scale Contingency Environment
- Metrics Used by Civilian Partners
- Proposed Measures of Merit Hierarchy

Background

- ❁ November 1991: NATO Defense Research Group Panel-7 established an *Ad Hoc* Working Group to study modeling of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)
 - ❑ Produce measures of effectiveness
 - ❑ Identify enhanced analytical means for use in future studies
- ❁ Study was set in post-CFE European scenario and considered land tactical operations
- ❁ Major findings and recommendations were
 - ❑ Limited capability existed among participating nations to model C3I systems
 - ❑ Unable to produce an overall evaluation methodology or recommend specific enhancements to support future studies
 - ❑ Proposed a Research Study Group (RSG) be formed to complete the *Ad Hoc* Working Group's tasking

Background (2)

- ✿ April 1994: RSG-19 was approved and subsequently identified causes for the AHWG's failure
 - Scope too broad
 - Focused on performance of C3I systems rather than their relationships with other systems and organizations
 - Examined existing models rather than global measures of effectiveness, impacts, and relationship among systems
- ✿ RSG-19 efforts
 - Focused on modeling of Command and Control (C2)
 - Developed a Code of Best Practices (COBP)
- ✿ RSG-19 Recommended
 - COBP be adopted as an acceptable standard for evaluating C2 contribution to military operations
 - Basic research and modeling be expanded to include (1) Operations Other Than War (OOTW), (2) information operations, and (3) cognitive processes used in human decision making
 - A follow-on SAS working group study modeling of OOTW


Scope of Study

- In April 2000: SAS Panel-027 established to develop COBP for modeling OOTW within Small-Scale Contingencies
 - Based on research and recommendations of exploratory group (SAS-E06)
 - Panel must coordinate closely with
 - SAS Panel-025 (Long Term Defense Planning)
 - SAS Panel 026 (On the Effectiveness of Command and Control on Force Effectiveness)
- Panel's focus is on modeling SSC requirements for defense resource planning at the national strategic level
 - Determining future force structure requirements
 - Selecting equipment acquisition alternatives
- Another SAS Panel (044) will be formed to address SSC modeling support at the operational level and during ongoing operations

Smaller Scale Contingencies

- Generally fall between routine peacetime engagement activities and major theatre war (MTW), and typically involve international intervention in an affected nation
- Usually these interventions – that may or may not involve military forces – are complex emergencies involving both a civil conflict and humanitarian crisis, and require multi-dimensional application of resources to restore order
- The military forces are typically in a supporting role and it is important that the military objectives support the achievement of the political objectives

Multidimensional Sectors of National Power



Derived from the USG Generic Interagency
Political-Military Plan

- **Situations that Typically Lead to International Interventions**

- Failed State
- Weak State
- Contested/Conflicted State
- Repressive State
- Rogue State
- Sanctuary for Terrorists
- Drug Producing State
- UN Transitional Authority
- Economic Development
- Natural or Manmade Disasters

- **Interventions**

- Require application of multidimensional resources based on specific needs of affected nation
- Donor nations and international community provide assistance
- Restore the affected nation to peer status

Types of Interventions

- ✚ Interventions *may* or *may not* use military force
 - **Military forces** currently involved in 16 ongoing UN authorized peace operations
 - **Civilian partners** — donor nations and other civilian agencies — are involved in these peace operations, but also intervene in 13 national and 5 regional complex emergencies without international military forces (see: *ReliefWeb* “Complex Emergencies”)
- ✚ Civilian-led interventions usually accomplish humanitarian or developmental goals with the concurrence of the affected nation and include multiple partners
 - **Bilateral assistance:** Donor governments (USAID, DfID, etc.) through host nation authorities
 - **Multilateral assistance:** Donor governments through inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) such as UN agencies, OSCE, etc.
 - **Other assistance:** Non-governmental assistance
 - International organizations (IOs) such as ICRC, IFRC, etc.
 - Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from developed nations
- ✚ When *military force* is necessary
 - It is typically because
 - **Peace and security must be restored** in the affected nation
 - Force is, or may be needed, **to ensure compliance** by the affected nation with the mandate authorized for the intervention
 - It may or may not have affected nation concurrence, but usually requires
 - Consensus of other peer nations
 - Authorization from a UN Security Council Resolution which establishes the mandate for the intervention

Authorization for Intervention: Resolution, Mandate, and Mission

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)

- The Security Council is assigned responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24 UN Charter)
- Resolutions are the formal expression of opinion, will, or intent voted by Security Council members to carry out its responsibilities
- UN member nations agree to accept and carry out the Security Council decisions conveyed in resolutions (Article 25)


Mandate

- Authoritative command derived from the Security Council Resolution
- Establishes the **legal basis and the specific actions authorized by the Security Council** to be taken by the civilian and/or military partners to carry out the resolution

Mission for a *military force* is derived from the Mandate

- A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose [Source: AAP-6(R)]
- The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason thereof [Source: Joint Pub 1-02]
- Must be accomplished within the broader context of the Mandate in coordination with other **civilian partners**

Potential Global Partners During International Interventions



• Intervention Causes

- Failed State
- Weak State
- Contested/Conflicted State
- Repressive State
- Rogue State
- Sanctuary for Terrorists
- Drug Producing State
- UN Transitional Authority
- Economic Development
- Natural or Manmade Disasters

• Roles of Partners

- Vary based on cause and urgency of operation
- Vary over time as conditions change

MCDA Service Modules

- Currently identify capabilities required in *11 functional categories*
 - Aviation Operations (6 modules)
 - Command and Control (5 modules)
 - Communications (4 modules)
 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal (3 modules)
 - Engineering (11 modules)
 - Logistics Support (9 modules)
 - Medical (3 modules)
 - NBC Support (7 modules)
 - Search & Rescue (4 modules)
 - Surface Transportation (5 modules)
 - Water Supply and Distribution (5 modules)
- Modules are described by
 - Specific capability required that can be provided by either **military** or **civil defense** assets (or by **NGOs** or **contractors**)
 - Sometimes specify numbers of personnel, vehicles, and types of communications needed
 - Deployment priority (only WFP modules) as immediate or high or moderate priority

Examples of MCDA Service Modules

AV-04B: *Airport Ground Handling*

Capability: For a specific airfield, provide manpower and support equipment to load and unload aircraft on a 24 hour per day basis during humanitarian relief operations in coordination with local airport authorities; establish and operate marshalling yard; capabilities include handling 400 metric tons of cargo and 100 passengers per day with a maximum of 30 aircraft per day

EN-03: *Site Preparation and Development*

Capability: Provide civil engineering capability to prepare and develop as many as 20 refugee camp sites (5,000 person capacity per site) at a rate of 2 camps per week on undeveloped land; includes site preparation, construction, maintenance with planned camp life of 2 years

LG-03A: *Warehousing and Store Keeping*

Capability: Provide self-contained stand-alone warehousing facilities and store keeping for food and non-food items and other goods and materials for up to 250,000 aid recipients


Application of MoM to Defense Resource Planning

- The primary interest at the national strategic level is to ensure appropriate military resources are available
 - When and where needed to carry out assigned missions
 - In sufficient quantities to ensure success of these operations
- To determine future SSC military force structure and equipment requirements
 - Analyst must bound uncertainties concerning
 - **Types** of future SSCs in which the national **military forces** will be employed
 - The **size** and **duration** of **military force** involvement
 - The **role** of **military forces** and their **civilian partners**
 - Examine a robust but plausible set of scenarios

Measures of Merit

- The criteria for establishing an objective set of relevant metrics is important for the planning of future force structures and equipment acquisitions
- While there is no agreed definition of metrics used for analysis, the Research and Technology Organisation Technical Report 9 provides a useful hierarchical framework for defining measures of merit (MOM) for analysis of command and control
- The hierarchy begins with dimension parameters and ends with measures of policy effectiveness

Proposed Measure of Merit Hierarchy




Examples of MoM for Three Types of SSCs

Operation	Example	DP	MoP	MoE	MoFE	MoPE
Non Combatant Evacuation	Sierra Leone	Helicopter 1. Passenger capacity 2. Range	Rate of evacuation for a single helicopter as a function of range and density altitude	Rate for a unit of helicopters to evacuate people in a non-permissive environment	1. Time to complete evacuation 2. Percentage of people evacuated	1. Total casualties among evacuees and military forces 2. People still at risk
Coercion (Strikes and Raids)	Deliberate Force (Kosovo)	Range and payload of an aircraft	1. Circular error probable of a system 2. Daily sortie rate	1. Number of targets hit per day 2. Collateral damage based on accuracy of delivery	1. Time to destroy all targets/total collateral damage 2. Own force casualties 3. Percentage of targets that can be destroyed	1. Response of opponent 2. Extent of collateral damage
Peace Support	Bosnia	1. Rate of movement of patrols 2. Number of patrols per company per week	1. Area covered by patrol per day 2. Expected casualties if patrol attacked 3. Frequency of patrol visits	1. Reduction in murder rate in patrolled areas 2. Patrol casualties 3. Time to next incident after a patrol	1. Murder rate 2. Number of violations of ceasefire agreement 3. Displaced person returns 4. Percent of crimes solved	1. Percentage of civil authority functions conducted by local people 2. Percentage of popular support for government 3. Support by factions 4. Duration of military deployment 5. Intervention force casualties


Military and Non-Military Dimensions

- Intervention components: Since many SSCs involve significant non-military dimensions
 - It is essential to consider the impact of non-military factors on the military intervention force and the impact of the military on the civil society
 - It is possible for one component to succeed in its mission while undermining the mission of another
- The selected measure of policy effectiveness should allow the analyst to distinguish between outcomes in which a force is successful in completing its mission and either does or doesn't undermine other intervention components.

Solution Space for SSC Studies



Task Decomposition--MOPE to MOE



Selecting MoMs

Appropriate MoMs will depend on

- Physical properties or characteristics for DP
- Type of system or force element tasks for MoP
- Types of operations and scenario-dependent tasks for MoE
- Mission for the MoFE
- Mandate for MoPE

Desirable MoM Characteristics

- | | | |
|-----------|------------------|------------|
| Valid | Mission-oriented | Reliable |
| Sensitive | Measurable | Meaningful |
| Objective | Discriminatory | Inclusive |
| Realistic | Simple | |

Interrelationships among MoM

- Decision makers need to know how resource allocations impact outcomes
- Analyst's goal is to be able to demonstrate **causality** and at least some degree of **predictability** between lower and higher level MoM
- For some types of operations involving only military elements this is relatively easy
- More difficult when both **civilian** and **military** tasks interact within the **affected nation**;
for example, rapid disarmament and demobilization by the **military** can exacerbate **civilian** reintegration efforts and result in an increase in criminal activities

Selecting MoMs (2)

- Surrogate MoMs may be required, especially for MoPE
 - Policy frequently is not clearly articulated and end states may evolve
 - Often use abstract or intangible terms such as ***stability, normality of life, or freedom of movement***
 - Partners' tasks are intended to ***influence the population*** and ***change the government of the affected nation***, not to defeat an "enemy"
 - Quantitative or qualitative performance indicators can identify outputs to be monitored to measure the operational impact on the policy or force objectives
- Expect conflicts among MoMs
 - Multiple, complex, and often conflicting strategies are usually at work on different time lines
 - Increased force protection may restrict delivery of food or medical aid
 - Urgent infrastructure restoration by intervening forces could delay economic development and improvement in affected nation capacity
 - May need to select a primary MoM to be maximized, but subject to minimum values established for others
- SSCs involve continuous but parallel ***civilian*** and ***military*** campaign planning
 - Roles may change e.g., from provider to facilitator
 - Responsibilities may pass from ***military*** to ***civilian*** to ***affected nation*** as conditions improve
 - The MoM need to account for these changes and should be continuous, not binary, so that trends can be monitored

Recommendations from SAS Panel-027

- Adapt the COBP-proposed MoM hierarchy for defense resource planning
- Coordinate closely with SAS-044 to ensure consistency in analytical support and MoM application at national strategic and operational levels
- Encourage SAS-044 to continue research to determine what MoMs and metrics are used for operational planning and monitoring by
 - National and international development agencies and other civilian partners
 - SFOR and KFOR in their periodic review processes
- Recommend in the COBP that NATO members and partners use Service Modules during
 - Defense resource-related studies
 - Collaborative planning with civilian partners
 - Exercises and contingency operations

Back Ups

Small Scale Contingencies Are International Interventions

- ☉ Nations rarely intervene with force in the affairs of other sovereign nations
- ☉ There are no agreed criteria to determine when and why interventions should occur, but generally they are initiated because
 - ☒ **Peer nations want to help:** humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, development assistance, etc.
 - ☒ **Affected nation may adversely impact region:** peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations often are complex emergencies with both conflict and humanitarian elements
- ☉ Many causal factors can contribute to interventions
 - ☒ **Failed State*** – A state lacking centralized authority and in a situation of general anarchy, such that there is no authority to provide effective national protection
 - ☒ **Weak State*** – A state that has a semblance of authority, but is unable to exercise effective power over all of its territory. Authority may be limited geographically, or in terms of the ability to carry out state functions (e.g., provision of services, or maintenance of law and order)
 - ☒ **Conflicted or Contested State*** – A state that is not necessarily weak, but in which there is a conflict between groups for control of the state or specific geographic areas within the state. The state may be willing to extend national protection only to persons from particular groups or regions
 - ☒ **Repressive State*** – A state that exercises authority but does not extend protection to all of its citizens. Repressive states command strong central authority, and are able to crush potential rebellions and outbreaks of violent conflict

* Source: UNHCR Paper “*Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace*,” 19 September 1997

Many Types of Military Operations within Smaller Scale Contingencies

- The Mandate and Mission assigned to a *military force* may involve several types of operations other than war during a single SSC
- National doctrines vary somewhat, but generally include the following types of operations other than war:
 - Arms Control
 - Combating Terrorism
 - Counterdrug Operations
 - Humanitarian Assistance
 - Military Support to Civil Authorities
 - Nation Assistance
 - Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
 - Peace Operations
 - Recovery Operations
 - Sanction Enforcement
 - Strikes and Raids
 - Support to Counterinsurgency
 - Support to Insurgencies
- Military OOTW may be conducted
 - Simultaneously or sequentially
 - On an emergency basis until civilian capacity can be deployed
 - Until security is under civilian control and military responsibilities are handed off to appropriate civilian authorities

Military Interventions

- ✚ When *military intervention* is necessary, it typically
 - ▣ Occurs into an ongoing *civilian-led* intervention
 - ▣ Has several *phases* with *changing roles and responsibilities*

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>On-Scene Responsibility</u>
<i>Stop Fighting</i>	Peace Enforcement	<i><u>Military Lead</u></i> – Others Support
<i>Separate Factions</i>	Peacekeeping	<i><u>Military</u> and <u>Civilian Share Lead</u></i>
<i>Impose Law and Order</i>	Policing, Judiciary, and Penal Institution Operation	<i><u>Civilian Mission Lead</u></i> – <i><u>Military</u></i> and Others Support
<i>Restore Economy and Governance Institutions</i>	Economic and Governance Development	<i><u>Civilian Mission Lead</u></i> – Others Support (limited <i><u>Military</u></i>)
<i>Nurture Society</i>	Social Development	<i><u>Civilian Mission Lead</u></i> – Others Support (limited <i><u>Military</u></i>)

- ▣ Phases are likely to occur nearly simultaneously and have considerable overlap, and military redeployment is possible only when *threat of fighting* is reduced and *law and order and public security* have been restored
- ▣ Recent operations in East Timor and Kosovo illustrate the dynamic and complex nature of interventions

East Timor – Transition from Civilian to Military Intervention

- UN Mission East Timor (UNAMET)* – A *civilian-led intervention* to *oversee the vote* on independence and *a transition period* pending implementation of the decision of the East Timorese people
- After voting held on 30 August 1999
 - A large majority of East Timorese decided to transition to independence
 - Pro-integration **militias** with the support of **Indonesian security forces** launched a **campaign of violence**
- International Military Force (INTERFET)** – A **military intervention** into an ongoing *civilian-led mission* (UNAMET) to
 - Take all necessary measures **to restore peace and security** in East Timor
 - **Use force as necessary** (authorized under Chapter VII of UN Charter)
 - Bring an immediate **end to aggression**
 - **Protect** UNAMET in carrying out its tasks
 - **Facilitate** within force capabilities **humanitarian assistance** to the affected population
- Factors impacting on INTERFET Mission
 - 600,000 affected population required protection, food, and adequate shelter
 - 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) to be returned to East Timor from other locations in Indonesia

* UNSCR 1246 dated 11 June 1999

** UNSCR 1264 dated 15 September 1999

East Timor – Transition From Military Force to UN Administration

- UN Transition Authority East Timor (UNTAET) is
 - A combined *civil-military* intervention
 - Responsible for the *administration* of East Timor
- UNTAET is *empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority*, including the *administration of justice*
 - To *provide security* and *maintain law and order*
 - To establish an *effective administration*
 - To assist in the *development of civil and social services*
 - To ensure the coordination and delivery of *humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance*
 - To *support capacity-building for self-government*
 - To assist in the establishment of *conditions for sustainable development*
- Authorized Organizational Structure
 - A *governance and administration component*
 - An *international police force* of up to 1,640 officers
 - A *military component* with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and 200 military observers
 - A *humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component*

Pre-Conflict, Conflict, and Post-Conflict Arrangements in Kosovo

- **OSCE Verification Mission*** operated from 24 October 1998 to 20 March 1999
- NATO's Operation Allied Force *conducted bombing* from 23 March to 10 June 1999
- UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999 authorized
 - Early and rapid deployment of effective *civil* and *security* presences in Kosovo
 - Unlike **UNTAET**, this arrangement retains separate *civilian* (**UNMIK**) and *military* (**KFOR**) entities
- Mandates
 - **Kosovo Force (KFOR)** deployed on 12 June
 - Establish and maintain a *secure environment*, including *public safety and order*
 - *Monitor, verify* and, when necessary, *enforce compliance* with the conditions of the Military Technical Agreement and the UCK Undertaking
 - *Provide assistance to UNMIK*, including *core civil functions* until they are transferred to **UNMIK**
 - **UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)** Acting SRSG arrived 13 June, SRSG on 15 July
 - Promote establishment of substantial *autonomy and self-government* in Kosovo
 - Perform basic *civilian administrative functions*
 - *Facilitate a political process* to determine Kosovo's future
 - *Support reconstruction of key infrastructure* and *humanitarian and disaster relief*
 - *Maintain civil law and order*
 - *Promote human rights*
 - Assure the *safe and unimpeded return* of all refugees and displaced persons

* UNSCR 1203 dated 24 October 1998

Authorized Organizational Structure for Kosovo

- ❖ UNMIK established with four sectors also known as “pillars”
 - ❖ **Pillar I:** Humanitarian Affairs (UNHCR): *resettlement and relief efforts*; mission completed June 2000
 - ❖ **Pillar II:** Civilian Administration (UN): *civilian police, judicial affairs, civil affairs* supported by an *international police force* of up to 4,700 officers
 - ❖ **Pillar III:** Institution Building(OSCE): *human capacity, democratization, and human rights*
 - ❖ **Pillar IV:** Reconstruction and Economic Development (EU): *shelter, utilities, transportation, communications, and agriculture*
- KFOR provides the *military component* with a strength of up to 50,000 troops (NATO and other allies)
- Factors impacting on KFOR mission
 - ❖ Refugees to return to Kosovo: 230,000 in Macedonia, 430,000 in Albania, 64,000 in Montenegro, 21,500 in Bosnia, and 61,000 in other countries
 - ❖ 580,000 remaining in Kosovo were homeless
 - ❖ By 3 August more than 750,000 refugees returned to Kosovo adding to the homeless and the humanitarian needs
 - ❖ Deployed international police: 1,000 by 7 Sep 99 and 3,600 (~76% of authorized strength) by May 00
- UNMIK, KFOR, and KLA met as *Joint Implementation Commission* starting on 22 June 1999

Agenda

- ⊕ Background and Scope of Study
- ⊕ Small Scale Contingency Environment
- ⊕ *Metrics Used by Civilian Partners*
- ⊕ Proposed Measures of Merit Hierarchy

Red Cross Movement Code of Conduct

- Document created in September 1995 by the Movement and other interested parties
 - **Prepared by:** International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC)
 - **Supported by:** Caritas International, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, and the World Council of Churches
- Establishes 10 points to guide how humanitarian assistance will be rendered during disaster relief operations and addresses
 - Providing humanitarian assistance impartially, without regard to race, creed, or nationality, or contingent upon political or religious beliefs
 - Building local capacity by involving the beneficiaries in management of relief aid and reducing future vulnerabilities
 - Ensuring information and publicity recognize the victims as dignified humans and not hopeless objects
- Two points could become impediments to achieving unity of effort in complex contingencies
 - **Point 4:** “We shall endeavor not to act as an instrument of government foreign policy”
 - **Point 9:** “We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.”

Code of Conduct Working Environment

- ⊕ Outlines recommendations to nations and inter-governmental organizations when responders* comply with the Code
- ⊕ Nations Affected by Disasters
 - ⊞ Responders should be ***granted rapid and impartial access to victims***
- ⊕ Donor Nations
 - ⊞ Responders should be ***recognized as independent bodies***
 - ⊞ ***Independence and impartiality of responders should be respected***
- ⊕ Inter-Governmental Organizations
 - ⊞ Must ***respect the independence and impartiality of responders***
 - ⊞ ***UN Agencies should consult*** with these responders ***when preparing relief plans***

Establishes: (1) an agreed **civilian** framework for how NGHA will provide humanitarian assistance during disaster relief operations, and (2) emphasizes **building local capacity**

* The responding International and Non-Governmental Organizations are referred to as Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHA) in the Code, which can be located at <http://www.ifrc.org/>

Oslo Guidelines for Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets

- Response to 1991 UN General Assembly resolution (46/182) to evaluate whether the use of military and civil defense assets for international disaster relief operations could be formalized
 - Joint meeting sponsored by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and NATO held in Brussels in 1992 concluded that it could
 - Established a Standing Coordinating Group to implement the recommendations
- Norway hosted a high level international conference in 1994
 - 45 nations participated
 - 25 IGOs, IOs, and NGOs also participated
 - Produced the “Oslo Guidelines” to ensure the highest possible standards for international disaster relief assistance
- The 1994 Guidelines establish
 - Principles, procedures, legal status, and measures for coordinated use of both **Military** and **Civil Defense** Assets (MCDA) during international disaster relief operations
 - Responsibilities for assisting, transit, and affected nations
- Switzerland has recently circulated a proposal to extend these Guidelines to include *complex emergencies*

* See http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/programs/response/sarnet.htm or Appendix E of IDA Document D-2349 *Potential Global Partners for Smaller-Scale Contingencies*, August 2000

Application of Military and Civil Defense Assets

- The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) operates the *Military Civil Defense Unit* (MCDU) to
 - Identify key **Service Modules**
 - Maintain the register of MCDA and other emergency resources
 - Conduct training and seminars
 - Establish the standby air operations cell when required
 - Develop procedures for the UN Joint Logistics Center
 - Operate information networks such as ReliefWeb and the Integrated Regional Information Network, and OCHA On-line web-based registers of available resources
- Service Modules were developed under the Guidelines to identify the capabilities that are most likely in future emergencies
 - With UNHCR, WFP, NATO, donor nations, and NGO collaboration, 62 type modules have been developed to support the Guidelines
 - Through 1999, 52 type modules have actually been employed during various contingencies

Potential Utility of Service Modules

- Some *IOs and NGOs* have already organized response capacities in accordance with Service Module capabilities; national *military* forces could identify similar modules within their structures
- Modules establish metrics that
 - Quantify tasks
 - Provide measurable standards
- Modules currently focus on disaster relief but
 - Serve as the basis for determining *civilian and military resource substitutability*
 - Could use further refinement for medical, command and control, search and rescue, and other functions
- Same process could be extended under Swiss proposal to *complex contingencies* by
 - Linking it with the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) **Standby Arrangement System*** (SAS) for peacekeeping operations
 - Adding unique functions required during complex contingencies
 - Constabulary forces, civilian police forces and observers, information and public diplomacy, and civil-military cooperation

* The SAS identifies more than 100 tables of organization and equipment that are common to Chapter VI type peacekeeping operations

The Sphere Project

- Ongoing effort of civilian humanitarian agencies now in its fourth year
- Provides a humanitarian charter and minimum standards for disaster response* in five categories
 - Water supply and sanitation
 - Nutrition
 - Food aid
 - Shelter and site planning
 - Health Services
- Charter establishes, monitors, and guides activities using
 - **Minimum Standard**: The minimum levels to be attained in each area
 - **Key Indicator**: “Signals” that show whether the standard has been attained. They provide a way of measuring and communicating both the impact, or result, of programs as well as process or methods used. The indicators may be qualitative or quantitative.
 - **Guidance Notes**: Include specific points to consider when applying the standard in different situations, guidance on tackling practical difficulties, and advice on priority issues. They may also include critical issues relating to the standard or indicators, and describe dilemmas, controversies, or gaps in current knowledge.

*See: “*The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*,”
<http://www.sphereproject.org>

Application of Sphere Standards

- ◻ During Analysis
 - ▣ Initial assessment
 - ▣ Response strategy development
 - ▣ Monitoring and evaluation progress
 - ▣ Includes participation by affected population in the design and implementation of programs
- ◻ During Support to the Affected Population
 - ▣ **Water and Sanitation:** supply, excreta disposal, vector control, solid waste management, drainage, and hygiene promotion
 - ▣ **Nutrition:** nutrient supply, food quality and safety, food acceptability, handling and safety, targeting populations suffering malnutrition
 - ▣ **Food Aid:** requirements, targeting recipients, resource management, logistics, distribution
 - ▣ **Shelter and Site Planning:** shelter, clothing, household items, site selection and planning
 - ▣ **Health Services:** measles control, control of communicable diseases, health care services
- ◻ During Human Resource Capacity Building and Training
 - ▣ Competence, support, and local capacity

Examples of Sphere Project Key Indicators

Water Storage

- At least 15 liters of water per person per day is collected
- Flow at each collection point is at least 0.125 liters per second
- At least 1 water point per 250 people
- Maximum distance from any shelter to the nearest water point is 500 meters

Food Aid Requirements

- 2,100 kcals per person per day
- 10-12% of total energy provided by protein
- 17% of energy provided from fat

Health Information Monitoring and Evaluation

- Decreasing death rate aiming towards less than 1/10,000/day
- Under 5 mortality rate is reduced to no more than 2/10,000/day
- Epidemics are controlled, etc.

Sphere Project

(1) Establishes measurable standards, key indicators, and guidance notes

(2) Applies: (a) during assessments, (b) when supporting the affected population, and (c) when building local capacity


Donor Nation Development Agencies – U.S. Agency for International Development

- Donor nation international *development agencies* (USAID, DfID, CIDA, etc.) are concerned with indicators for their development programs
- USAID's Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators* is used for
 - **Strategic planning** – setting agency goals and objectives within a nation
 - **Performance monitoring** – program execution
- Establishes a framework of Agency goals and objectives
- Goal 2: *Democracy and Good Governance Strengthened*
 - **Objective 2.1:** *Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights*
 - **Objective 2.2:** *More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes*
 - **Objective 2.3:** *Increased Development of a Politically Active Civil Society*
 - **Objective 2.4:** *More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions*
- Objectives are then broken down into intermediate results (IRs) and sub-intermediate results (sub-IRs)

* See: “Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators,” USAID, August 1998 and “Managing Democratic Electoral Assistance: A Practical Guide for USAID.”

Illustration –

Objective 2: Rule of Law IRs and Sub-IRs



Examples of USAID Indicators for Intermediate Results

- ✚ Quantitative and qualitative indicators for IRs and Sub-IRs include
 - Definition and unit of measure
 - Relevance of indicator
 - Data collection methods and approximate costs
 - Target setting and trend line interpretation issues
- ✚ Example: Immediate Result 2.1.3 *Equal Access to Justice*
 - Number of new courts opened in rural and urban areas with concentrations of marginalized populations
 - Number of courts, police posts per 100,000 population
 - Percent of citizens who say they have access to court systems to resolve disputes
 - Percent of accused not represented at trial
- ✚ Example: Sub-Intermediate Result 2.1.3.1 *Increased Availability of Effective Legal Services*
 - Number of public defenders (and defenders provided through legal aid, and law clinic defenders) per 100,000 population
 - Percent change in cases handled by public defenders, legal aid, or law clinics
 - Number of cases using alternative systems
 - Percent of plaintiffs appearing *pro se* who report court documents and procedures were made available upon request
 - Arbitration centers for commercial dispute resolution are established

Logical Framework* (Logframe) and Performance Indicators

- Logframe used by the *World Bank* since 1997
 - Created by USAID in 1969 and used widely throughout the donor community
 - The Bank's central methodology for **operations planning, supervision, and implementation**
- A tool to communicate the essential elements of a complex project clearly and succinctly
 - Defines a set of **relationships among providers and users**
 - Includes a **monitoring and evaluation system** for the specific operation
 - Defines the level, people, events, process, documents and information used
- Monitoring and Evaluation done at three levels
 - **Program Level:** Evaluation
 - **Management Level:** Performance monitoring, focusing on achievement of outcomes
 - **Operation Level:** Progress monitoring by reviewing implementation status versus time, plans, and disbursement schedules and other milestones
- Performance Indicators
 - Measure operation impact, outcome, and outputs to be monitored
 - Provide forecasts and early warning and insights into validity of assumptions and risks

* See: <http://www.worldbank.org/html/oed/evaluation/html/logframe.html>

Logframe Matrix

Narrative Summary	Performance Indicators	Monitoring/ Evaluation Supervision	Important Assumptions
Goal: Higher objective to which this project, along with others, will contribute.	Indicators (increasingly standardized) to measure program performance.	The program evaluation system.	(Goal to Super Goal) Risk regarding strategic impact.
Direct Objective (DO) The impact of this project. The change in beneficiary behavior, systems or institutional performance because of the combined output and key assumptions	Impact Measures that describe the accomplishment of the Program DO The value, benefit and return on investment.	People, events, processes, sources of data for organizing the project evaluation system.	(DO to Goal) Risk regarding program level impact.
Outputs The project intervention. What the project can be held accountable for producing.	Indicators that measure the value added of implementation of the components.	People, events processes, sources of data – supervision and monitoring system for project implementation.	(Output of DO) Risk regarding design effectiveness.
Components The main component clusters that must be undertaken in order to accomplish the Outputs.	Input/Resources Budget by component. Monetary, physical, and human resources required to product the Outputs.	People, events, processes, sources of data and monitoring system for project design.	(Component to Output) Risk regarding implementation and efficiency.

World Bank

World Development Indicators

- *World Bank* also publishes an annual report of World Development Indicators*
- Allows for country-by-country, regional, or global comparisons across many categories and sectors
 - **International Development:** size of economy, development progress, etc.
 - **People:** labor force, employment, poverty, education, health, mortality, etc.
 - **Environment:** water, land use, pollution, energy and agricultural production, etc.
 - **Economy:** structure and growth, finances, expenditures, and debt, etc.
 - **States and Markets:** investments, tax policy, defense expenditures, etc.
 - **Global Linkages:** commodity prices, tariff barriers, financial flows, etc.
- Provides useful definitions and long term historical trends

World Development Indicators

May contribute to: (1) understanding underlying causes for a complex contingency, and (2) serve as standards to determine when the affected nation has returned to its pre-crisis condition

* See: *World Development Indicators*, World Bank published annually.